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CifEXRIGRT DEPOSIT. 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 



COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS 
SALES AGENTS 

NEW YORK 

LEMCKE & BUECHNER 
30-32 West 27th Street 

LONDON 

HUMPHREY MILFORD 
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SHANGHAI 

EDWARD EVANS & SONS, Ltd. 
30 North Szechuen Road 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAE 

(1913-1914) 



BY 

LEWIS EINSTEIN 

WITH A FOREWORD BY 
THEODORE ROOSEVELT 




MM 



COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS 
1918 

All rights reserved 



-^% 






Copyright, 1918 
By Columbia University Press 



Printed from type, April, 1918 



MAY 16 1918 



"^^ 



.A497326 



PUBLISHERS' NOTE 

Mr. Lewis Einstein's connection with the 
American diplomatic service began in 1905, 
when he was appointed third secretary of our 
embassy at Paris, and extended into the year 
1916, when he served as charge d'affaires on a 
special mission to Bulgaria. In the interval 
he served at London, Constantinople, and 
Peking, at the Algeciras Conference, and as 
Minister to Costa Rica. He is the author 
of "The Italian Renaissance in England," 
** American Foreign Policy, by a Diplomatist," 
'* Inside Constantinople: A Diplomatist's 
Diary during the Dardanelles Expedition," 
and of numerous monographs and addresses 
on diplomatic, literary, and art history. The 
two essays in this volume formed part of a 
series which appeared in the National Review 
of London. The first was published in 
January, 1913, and the second in November, 
1914. They are now republished both as 
records of the past and as warnings for the 
future. 



FOREWORD 

Mr. Lewis Einstein is one of the men 
whose work has kept aUve the fine tradition 
of the union between American diplomacy 
and American letters which is illustrated by 
such names as those of Lowell and Motley, 
of John Hay and Maurice Egan. In the 
two chapters of this little book he gives 
proof of a prescience in world politics very 
rare among American statesmen. He fore- 
saw the war. He foresaw our entry into the 
war. He sees clearly the need that our asso- 
ciation with the British Empire shall be one 
of the closest friendship because it would be 
an unspeakable calamity for us if the British 
Empire succumbed to Germany; and after 
the war Germany will once more begin her 
campaign to render America the dupe and 
tool of European militarism by breeding hos- 
tihty to England; and with this end in view 



FOREWORD 



she will employ everybody, from organizers 
of German-American Alliances to editors of 
German-American papers; and of course she 
counts in advance on the support of poli- 
ticians like Senators La Toilette and Stone 
and editors like Messrs. Hearst and Viereck. 
Under such conditions it is well to have 
Americans like Mr. Einstein — who, like my- 
self, is not of English blood — point out why 
England is now what a century ago she was 
not, our natural ally; and why Germany, 
in view of the appalling results of her sordid 
and brutal soul-training for the last forty 
years, cannot be anything but our enemy 
until the whole moral and political attitude 
of her people is fundamentally changed. 
The pacifists of the Norman Angell type, 
whether in England or America, and the 
silly men and silly women who listen to 
them, are, as they have been, the potent 
enemies of the peace of justice and the tools 
of alien militarism. Unfortunately in this 
country, while there has at times been a 



FOREWORD 9 



repulsive social anglo-mania among limited 
classes, the political clanger has always been 
from the appeal of demagogic politicians to 
the anti-English vote. This manifested it- 
self in the cautious meekness with which our 
governmental authorities protested against 
the repeated wholesale murders of our men 
and women by German submarines, com- 
pared with the hectoring attitude assumed 
towards Great Britain over mere property 
rights — a striking inversion of Abraham 
Lincoln's insistence on putting the man 
above the dollar. Mr. James Brown Scott, 
in his "Survey of International Relations 
between the United States and Germany," 
justly remarks: — ''The reader experiences 
a shock, on turning from the German to the 
British correspondence, to note the cold and 
unyielding terms in which American rights 
concerning property were insisted upon. It 
would seem as if the American Govern- 
ment feared a rupture with the Imperial 
German Government . . . and that the Pres- 



10 FOREWORD 

ident and his advisers had determined that 
no act on the part of the United States, 
that no unguarded word or expression in 
correspondence with Germany, should give 
the Imperial Government a pretext, much 
less a cause, to turn against the United 
States if it should seem to stand in the way 
of the realization of the purpose (the de- 
struction of England and the enslavement 
of Belgium) upon whose realization the 
German Government had bent its energies 
and upon which the German people had set 
their heart. . . . The neutrality which the 
President impressed upon his fellow coun- 
trymen was not merely the neutrality of 
action; it was the neutrality of thought and 
expression." This neutrality was neutrality 
between right and wrong; we persevered 
in it for two years and a half, and then the 
President, on April 2 last, announced that 
"the wrongs against which we now array 
ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut 
to the very roots of human life . . . Prop- 



FOREWORD 11 



erty can be paid for; the lives of peaceful 
and innocent people cannot be. The pres- 
ent German submarine warfare against com- 
merce is a warfare against mankind," and 
again on August 27 last: — "the object of 
this war is to deliver the free peoples of the 
world from the menace and the actual power 
of a vast military establishment controlled 
by an irresponsible Government which, hav- 
ing secretly planned to dominate the world, 
proceeded to carry the plan out without re- 
gard either to the sacred obligations of treaty 
or the long-established practices and long- 
cherished principles of international action 
and honor . . . which stopped at no barrier 
either of law or of mercy; which swept a 
whole continent within the tide of blood — 
not the blood of soldiers only but the blood 
of women and children also and of the help- 
less poor . . . the American people have 
suffered intolerable wrongs." All of this was 
absolutely true; and it was exactly as true 
when the Lusitania was sunk as it was two 



n FOREWORD 



years later. It was true throughout the 
period of our neutrahty. 

Under such conditions it is well to have 
a conscientious and highminded American 
citizen, who is also a trained and able diplo- 
mat, write such a little book as this. 

THEODORE ROOSEVELT 

Sagamore Hill, 
February 3, 1918 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 



Foreword 7 

The Anglo-German Rivalry and the United 

States 15 

The War and American Policy 50 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY AND 
THE UNITED STATES 

American life is still too intense, the 
problems of its economic development, and 
the relations between the individual and the 
State, still,' too, unsettled, to have aroused 
an interest in the nation at large in questions 
of foreign policy which are no less far-reach- 
ing in their nature because not visibly op- 
pressive. Yet the recent vast extension in 
foreign trade, and the gradual industrial 
evolution of the country, coupled with the 
growth of population, causing American 
exports to be increasingly manufactures, 
and decreasingly agricultural, must inevi- 
tably bring about an augmenting attention 
to questions of external order. Already, 
within the last decade, this has become 
noticeable in the importance which the so- 
called '*Open Door," in China, and the 
relations with Latin-America have assumed 



16 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

before the public eye. In both instances 
trade, present and future, has been the 
foundation and the objective of interest. 
The pohtical cloak assumed, in the one 
case, by often repeated formulas regarding 
the integrity of China, in the other, by the 
Monroe Doctrine and American sisterhood, 
has covered the very legitimate self-interest 
presented by the extension of commercial 
relations and the growth of the nation's 
influence. 

Beyond this, however, watchfulness 
ceased. The affairs of Europe, picturesque 
and weighty as they appeared, yet seemed 
to have no direct visible relation to the 
United States. In whatever direction might 
lie natural sympathies, the country as a 
whole remained unaware that its own 
interests were in any way concerned or 
affected by the future of the European 
problem, and continued indifferent thereto. 
A traditional disinterestedness continued 
as potent a formula of statecraft as half 
a century ago, without Americans realizing 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 17 

that altered conditions rendered necessary 
a modification of this attitude, and that 
the vast extension of international interests 
and the complexity of modern life no longer 
permitted former isolation. While the 
country had consciously altered its political, 
strategical, and economic situation in the 
world by the creation of new oversea 
interests and the industrial growth of a 
century, it yet cherished the illusion of 
being able to preserve intact diplomatic 
ideas that had long since served their time. 
The belief is still diffused that since in Europe 
America had no territorial interests nor am- 
bition, it had likewise no solicitude and could 
with impunity remain indifferent to what- 
ever occurred on its political plane. 

A brief retrospect suggests, however, 
ample proof to the contrary. The European 
balance of power has been such a permanent 
factor since the birth of the republic that 
Americans have never realized how its ab- 
sence would have affected their political 
status. American national existence was 



18 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

brought about by European dissension. 
When Pitt resisted Napoleon, the justifiable 
irritation we felt against British high- 
handedness at sea caused us to forget that 
England's fight was in reality ours as well, 
and that the undisputed master of Europe 
would not have been long in finding pretexts 
to reacquire the Louisiana territory which, 
except for England, he would never have 
relinquished. When the Holy Alliance en- 
deavored to concentrate the power of Europe 
under the banner of legitimacy and divine 
right. Canning, by inspiring the Monroe 
Doctrine, interposed an effective restraint 
in the Western Hemisphere, and in the 
oft-quoted phrase, "called in the New World 
to redress the balance of the Old." 

Fifty years later, had England joined 
France in recognizing the Confederacy or 
in her abortive Mexican adventure, the his- 
tory of the United States might have run 
a different course. At no time since the 
foundation of the Republic could a change 
materially altering the ancient European 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 19 

balance of power have been brought about 
without perceptibly affecting American in- 
terests and the position of the United States. 
Even to-day, in spite of the enormous in- 
crease in the country's resources and popula- 
tion, this political axiom holds as true as 
it did in the period of national formation 
and weakness. The undisputed para- 
mountcy of any nation, both by land and 
sea, must inevitably make that Power a 
menace and a peril to every other country. 
In the words of a distinguished Secretary 
of State, Mr. Olney, were the career of a 
Napoleon ever again to approach or even 
to threaten repetition, not merely sentiment 
and sympathy, but the strongest considera- 
tion of self-preservation and self-defense 
might compel the United States to take 
sides. It may therefore be of interest to 
survey the forces of war and peace to-day 
at work in Europe and see if there lies any 
menace to that balance of power, the preser- 
vation of which is essential to its national 
security. 



W A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

At a time when arbitration and peace 
movements have assumed an unprecedented 
importance, it is a curious commentary on 
the age that there should hkewise be so vast 
an increase of armaments and mihtary 
preparation. The same skepticism in ab- 
stract justice, the same behef in the possible 
imminence of a great conflict, the same 
desire on the part of every nation to be the 
arbiter of its own political fortunes, is ap- 
parent throughout the world. A feeling of 
unrest, moreover, has spread over Europe, 
and the inflammable state of its public 
opinion is everywhere noticeable. The mod- 
ern conception of the nation in arms, and 
the prolonged situation of a peace con- 
stantly more prepared for war is not the 
only cause for the existence of this spirit. 
The fresh taxation imposed by economically 
wasteful armaments, at the same time as 
nations find themselves increasingly com- 
pelled to embark on extensive and expensive 
programs of social reform, have contributed 
to augment the cost of life and the con- 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 21 

sequent dissatisfaction. There is, moreover, 
a growing discontent throughout Europe 
with the system of parhamentarism and 
certain effects of representative Government. 
I France, England, and Germany are all ex- 
periencing this, though for different causes 
and with different purposes in view. To 
a nation confronted by internal difficulties 
the diversion of an energetic foreign policy 
appealing to a united patriotism is always 
a possible alternative. That it has rarely 
been abused stands to the credit of European 
statesmanship. But in any survey of the 
existing situation it lurks in the background 
as a dangerous possibility. 

It remains an anomaly that modern 
democratic government has been no more 
peaceful than former absolutism. Moltke's 
prophecy that popular rule enhanced the 
likelihood of war was correct. The situation 
lately witnessed in the parliamentary dis- 
cussion over the Moroccan agreement in 
both Germany and France, where the leaders 
of political parties were far more combative 



22 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

and unyielding than their Government, 
proved significant, though in the one 
instance hostiHty was directed against 
England, while in the other it was against 
the compromising attitude on the part of 
the French Government. The high sen- 
sitiveness of a proud people, the confidence 
in its own strength, and the critical and 
often malignant scrutiny to which every 
Government is now exposed from within, 
are all factors contributing to embitter 
the atmosphere of international relations 
by stiffening the attitude of those in 
power. 

Various elements have thus contributed 
to bring about the present state of restless- 
ness and uncertainty in Europe. Nor are 
other signs wanting to confirm this. Like 
the flight of birds before a storm, some 
indication of the belief in the likelihood of 
an impending conflict may be gathered from 
the recent efforts on the part of the smaller 
European States to preserve their neutrality 
and their independence in the event of the 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 23 

greater Powers going to war. Belgium, 
Holland, the Scandinavian countries, and 
Switzerland, have each quite recently taken 
stock of their position in such event, and 
embarked on fresh military or naval pro- 
grams to increase the national security. A 
wave of renewed militarism and nationalism 
has spread over Europe. France, where it 
had lain dormant for years, is now witnessing 
an intense revival provoked by the recent 
difificulties with Germany over Morocco, and 
excited by its splendid success in aviation. 
In Russia the painful awakening after the 
Manchurian War has led to a reorganized 
army and the construction of a new navy. 
In Austria-Hungary the difficulties attending 
the late annexation prompted a military 
reform, while gratitude to Germany for the 
assistance rendered during that crisis, has 
led to an extensive battleship program and 
awakened for the first time naval ambition. 
Even Italy, whatever be the future of her 
newly designed African Empire, realizes that 
she has condemned herself during many 



24 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

years to come to a vastly increased expendi- 
ture for armaments. 

The sources of European unrest could, 
however, be lightly dismissed without the 
antagonism between Great Britain and Ger- 
many. In spite of the attempts made on 
both sides to explain it away, and to dwell 
on the pacific disposition animating the con- 
struction of new "Dreadnoughts," this re- 
mains as an irreducible fact obscuring the 
political horizon. Nor should it be regarded 
as a mere contest for commercial supremacy 
on the part of two countries, one seeking 
to preserve, the other to gain new markets. 
Intelligent Germans are the first to recognize 
that neither their merchants nor their trade 
suffer in British colonies. Beneath it lies 
the deeply conscious rival ambition of two 
great nations, the one to maintain un- 
diminished the heritage conquered by its 
forebears, the other to obtain the place 
"under the sun" which it regards as its 
right. And the magnitude of this issue is 
enhanced by the hardly lesser constellations 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 25 

gravitating around the rivals, each with its 
own historic traditions and interests, but 
who have reahzed comparative security in a 
system which finds its poHtical expression 
in the series of aUiances and understandings 
forming the balance of modern Europe. 

Paradoxical as it may seem, the grave 
danger of the present relations between Great 
Britain and Germany lies in the fact that 
there is no real difficulty between the two 
Powers. Where a concrete obstacle stands 
in the way, by compromise and mutual 
goodwill it may be removed. In recent 
years the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian 
negotiations, by a judicious policy of give- 
and-take, smoothed out through diplomatic 
means the colonial rivalry of a century. 
But between Germany and England similar 
adjustment is impossible. Their antagonism 
presents nothing concrete save rival am- 
bition. Both Powers are logical and right 
in their attitude. From England's point 
of view she is carrying out her traditional 
policy of wellnigh four centuries. Whether 



26 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

set forth by an Elizabethan Cecil or a modern 
Lloyd George, whether directed against a 
Spanish Armada, the ambition of Louis XIV, 
the legions of Napoleon, or the might of 
William II, the purpose is the same. The 
same causes have made her the enemy of 
France and Russia and the friend of Prussia, 
which make her to-day the friend of Russia 
and France and the adversary of a united 
Germany seeking oversea expansion. 

The position of Germany is no less logical. 
Having achieved her unity and imperial 
position by blood and iron, there is no reason 
why she should abandon the element of 
armed force which has been the mainspring 
of her triumph. Patriotic Germans may 
differ among themselves whether an increased 
naval program is advisable, but the nation 
is practically united with regard to the 
importance of maintaining her military su- 
premacy, both by reason of her exposed 
central continental position and because of 
the unhealed wound inflicted on her Western 
neighbor. It is no fault of Germany if 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 27 

her strength is so huge that Europe trembles 
when she moves. Nor is she to blame if 
in the quest for new outlets her efforts at 
expansion under her own flag are thwarted 
by the colonial empires of her rivals. The 
unfortunate position of Germany in this 
respect is readily apparent, but less obvious 
is any peaceful remedy compatible with 
the interests of neutrals. The suggestion 
lately advanced of compensation in the 
Congo, or in the Portuguese colonies, even 
if practicable, would only be a later cause 
of difficulty. It might delay, but could 
not arrest, the growing antagonism between 
two great countries in their struggle for 
supremacy. The appetite for colonies is fed 
on what it consumes, and a justifiable desire 
for more suitable frontiers or enlarged boun- 
daries would be the inevitable result of such 
surrender. What on one side could be re- 
garded as generosity, would on the other be 
interpreted as weakness, with the invitation 
for subsequent aggression brought about by 
the pressure of strength. 



28 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

There is no desire herein to criticize Ger- 
many. Her action, present and prospective, 
is that of a great nation conscious of its 
force, but conscious also of the Umitations 
of its present exercise and of having arrived 
too late in the field of colonial enterprise 
and conquest. On the side of Germany 
there should, however, be less irritation at 
the acts of other Powers desiring to preserve 
their own, and unwilhng to diminish an 
Empire won by the valor and foresight of 
their ancestors. 

While the Anglo-German antagonism finds 
sources of friction in Africa, its essence is, 
however, far more metropolitan than colo- 
nial, and its character psychological more 
than commercial. The feehng of hostile an- 
tagonism exists to-day among the English 
and German people to a greater extent than 
in their Governments. The latter realize 
vividly the terrific responsibihty of such a 
conflict, the magnitude of the interests in- 
volved, the catastrophic nature alike of 
victory or defeat. In the fact that neither 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 29 

can wish to precipitate this contest hes the 
surest hope for peace. 

Sir Frank Lascelles not long ago remarked 
that as each side awaited the other's ag- 
gression, it is Hkely that peace would long 
continue. Mutual hesitations exist which 
must counsel prudence. The prestige of Ger- 
many and of the Hohenzollern Dynasty, 
acquired by war but fortified by peace, is 
too great to risk everything in a struggle 
which if unsuccessful would shake the foun- 
dations of the throne. German military 
science has as its axiom, moreover, to embark 
on no war unless certain of success, while 
the destruction of its seagoing commerce 
is accepted as inevitable. France had in 
the past appeared to Germany as the hostage 
for England. But even in this, victory no 
longer seems as certain as in the past. In 
the eyes of experienced observers, the Ger- 
man army has deteriorated in recent years, 
while the French has commensurately im- 
proved. Now that the latter is no longer 
honeycombed by dissension, its still-existing 



30 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

superiority in artillery and its new develop- 
ment of aviation give it certain advantages 
over the greater numerical strength of Ger- 
many. For the first time, also, since Water- 
loo, England is able to throw a military force 
of consequence on continental soil. The six 
British divisions of professional soldiers 
equipped for foreign service and ready for 
early mobilization are to-day an actuality 
which Germany cannot fail to consider, and 
which should contribute toward remedying 
any inferiority in men from which France 
would suffer. The fields of Belgium may 
again witness a struggle where the descend- 
ants of Napoleon's and Wellington's men 
will this time stand side by side against 
Blucher's. 

If the uncertainty of victory on land as 
on sea thus imposes a restraint on the 
German warlike spirit, the tremendous conse- 
quences of a conflict likewise speak for 
prudence in Great Britain. The danger of 
a contest which would be a matter of life 
and death to her, the terrific sacrifices en- 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 31 

tailed even in the event of victory, the 
risk of starvation at home in case of disasters 
at sea, the possibiHty of invasion, the de- 
struction of the Empire if defeated, are all 
nightmares to appal the most venturesome 
statesman. 

There is little danger that, conscious of 
these grave responsibilities, any German or 
British Government would do ought to pre- 
cipitate a conflict of such gigantic pro- 
portions, however favorable the moment 
might appear. But there is serious danger 
lest, in an atmosphere as surcharged as is 
the present, with the deep-rooted feeling of 
hostility existing on both sides, some petty 
cause of friction, or some paltry colonial 
quarrel, inflaming public opinion, should in- 
duce either Government to prefer a foreign 
war which it might regard as inevitable to 
domestic humiliation. The explosion pro- 
voked by the so-called Agadir incident, which 
brought three nations to the verge of war 
for a few square miles of Moroccan sand, is 
indicative of the intensity of feeling aroused, 



32 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

and of the pregnancy of danger. Future 
war or peace is to-day in the hands of the 
EngHsh and German people far more than 
in that of their Governments. The decision 
rests with them not to goad the latter into 
assuming positions or advancing pretensions 
from which honorable retreat will have be- 
come impossible. 

Whatever be the future of this situation, 
a farsighted statesmanship compels the 
United States, as it does every other nation, 
to take cognizance of the possibility of a 
conflict breaking out in the near future be- 
tween Great Britain and Germany, and to 
consider in what manner we would be affected 
by it. It is an easy remedy to repeat the old 
adage about our proverbial noninterference 
in European affairs. With all respect toward 
a policy which in the past has been thoroughly 
sound, it cannot be said in this instance to 
offer a complete panacea. A struggle be- 
tween the two nations, even though it did 
not set ablaze the rest of Europe, cannot 
leave America indifferent. In too many re- 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 33 

gions of the world would our interests be 
affected by its reality. 

It would withal be absurd to deduce 
from this that we should be dragged into 
a war against our inclination. The alter- 
native of arms is no necessary consequence 
of diplomatic interest, and in such a conflict 
our direct participation would, if we main- 
tain our strength, be most unlikely. This 
should not, however, excuse any neglect 
on our part to consider the various political, 
strategic, and economic points of view in 
regions of the world interesting us, where 
such struggle would react upon them, or 
how the balance of power, which it should 
be our policy to preserve in Europe, would 
be affected by the contest. An indication 
of its far-reaching nature, independent of 
the actual field of hostilities, would, for 
instance, be presented in the Far East, 
where the even temporary withdrawal of 
European influence would leave us face to 
face with a commensurately more powerful 
Japan. To say nothing of the Philippines, 



34 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

the situation thus created depends on the 
degree of stabihty and strength attained by 
China - It is not difficult, however, to con- 
ceive of circumstances where to insure re- 
spect for the often pledged integrity of that 
State would lead us toward a course of 
action which we would be obliged to adopt 
single-handed, and without the benefit of 
such diplomatic support as in the past we 
have received from friendly Powers. 

Omitting, however, from consideration the 
extent to which the almost inevitable con- 
flagration would affect the world in a conflict 
between Great Britain and Germany, three 
general possibilities are open: (1) The vic- 
tory of the former; (2) The reverse; (3) 
A war of indefinite result. 

So far as we are concerned, the first alter- 
native would be the least likely to materially 
alter the existing status. England might 
conceivably recover a pecuniary indemnity 
and deal a death-blow to German oversea 
commerce. But the German colonies are 
not such as to sensibly attract a conqueror, 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 35 

nor would a change in their title affect us 
in any way. While the predominant position 
of Germany upon the European Continent 
would be shattered, the balance of power 
would hardly be affected, even though the 
disposition of its weight were altered. The 
insular position of Great Britain debars her 
from continental ambitions, and any attempt 
to assert herself in such manner would 
both run counter to all her traditions and 
be stoutly resisted by former allied States. 
It is fortunate that in modern times no 
nation has succeeded in being paramount 
on both land and sea. Great Britain has 
hitherto refrained from unduly developing 
her military strength and there is no reason 
to anticipate that flushed by victory she 
would adopt a different course. Her naval 
superiority, which is a matter of life and 
death, menaces no one, though it bars the 
way to Germany already supreme on land. 
But for us it represents an essential element 
in the maintenance and stabihty of the 
European balance of power. 



36 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

If the terms of peace after such a war were 
to be dictated in London, the situation as 
it affected us would be radically reversed. 
While defeat for Germany might prove dis- 
astrous to the dynasty, for Great Britain 
it would be fatal to the Empire, whose 
disintegration would almost inevitably ensue. 
It is apparent that the fate of Canada and 
the British possessions in America imme- 
diately concern us. Of Canadian loyalty 
to the Empire there is here no question. 
It is certain that, like the other self- 
governing British colonies, she would to the 
best of her ability support the mother coun- 
try. But if the fortune of war prove adverse, 
there is no reason to suppose that Canada 
would long continue under the control, how- 
ever nominal, of a parent State deprived of 
prestige and authority and ruined by an 
unsuccessful war. 

Nor is it necessary to proceed so far. 
The active participation of Canada in such 
conflict would by its very nature invite 
reprisals. If after a series of disasters Great 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 37 

Britain should be crushed and her fleet 
destroyed or captured, Canada could not by 
herself stand up against an all-powerful 
enemy, and the fate of the Crown colonies 
would be even more immediate. A strong 
appeal would in all likelihood be made for 
our protection, which could hardly fail to 
awaken generous response. The consequence 
of any such action on our part is apparent, 
reinforced, moreover, by an alternative which 
in contradiction to the Monroe Doctrine 
would ask us to countenance a transfer of 
sovereignty upon the American Continent 
for the benefit of a European Power hitherto 
deprived of such possession. 

Without going to the length of such 
extreme conclusions, a third and more likely 
possibility would be that of a contest long 
drawn out between the two countries wherein 
neither could obtain decisive advantage. In 
spite of the paper proof that a lengthy war 
presents to-day an economic impossibility, 
there is no practical evidence to substantiate 
this theory, and there are distinguished econ- 



38 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

omists who believe that the modern system 
of credit is pecuHarly adapted to faeihtate 
the prolongation of war. When poor coun- 
tries, like Japan and Russia, have been 
able to maintain in the field for a considerable 
duration armies of almost unprecedented 
size, there is no reason to suppose that the 
pinch of poverty alone would materially 
hasten the conclusion of a war between Eng- 
land and Germany. The financial aspect 
of this is also likely to concern us. If the 
struggle should be protracted, extensive bor- 
rowing will have to be undertaken, and New 
York is more and more becoming one of the 
money markets of the world. It is probable 
that we will be called upon, possibly by 
both sides, to furnish pecuniary assistance, 
even though the obligations of strict neu- 
trality are somewhat questionable on this 
point. 

The extended duration of the war may be 
expected from the policy Germany would 
presumably adopt in attempting to tire out 
the vigilance of a British blockading fleet by 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 39 

long-continued inaction, while perhaps strik- 
ing isolated blows in distant waters. The 
recent construction in Germany of large 
battle cruisers, capable of holding the seas, 
point to the inference that in the event 
of war hostilities would not remain confined 
to the vicinity of home ports. It would 
not be impossible if, as in the eighteenth 
century, sea-fights might again take place 
in American waters. The capture of one 
of the Lesser Antilles from the English 
or French might offer to the Germans both 
a convenient haven and a pledge for subse- 
quent negotiations. Our own attitude in 
this event would be one of no little difficulty. 
Logically, a policy of strict neutrality should 
cause us to remain, if not indifferent, at least 
passive, but it is questionable if any American 
Government could long tolerate the em- 
barrassment caused by the extended con- 
tinuance of hostilities in our waters, even 
though it led to no more regrettable nor 
permanent result. 

If this remains a remote though possible 



40 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

contingency, it is otherwise with the effect 
of a great struggle upon our economic 
interests. As all industry in the belligerent 
nations would be brought to a virtual stand- 
still, it is likely that while American manu- 
factured exports in Europe suffered there 
would be a greatly increased demand for 
foodstuffs as well as for whatever might 
be of utihty in the conduct of war. Such 
commercial losses as in Europe we should 
experience could be more than counter- 
balanced by the opportunity presented 
elsewhere to acquire new markets and sup- 
plant former rivals. This would give an 
unwonted impetus to trade. Our commerce 
should find before it in Latin-America, South 
Africa, Australia, and the Far East, new 
outlets and new opportunities as the conse- 
quence of such a struggle. 

Without a merchant marine under our 
flag we would not, however, be in a position 
to derive adequate benefit from this situ- 
ation. The export of American products 
would be rendered increasingly difficult by 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 41 

the few remaining neutral bottoms with 
the consequent increase in freight rates. 
The creation of our own merchant navy 
thus becomes a primary necessity, whether 
affected by postal subventions, direct sub- 
sidies, or the admission of foreign-built ships. 
The sad anomaly of the present position 
in this respect can hardly be overstated, 
and until we take steps to remedy the de- 
ficiency of existing navigation laws, all our 
efforts to win new markets will be severely 
handicapped. Pride is often the forerunner 
of real interest, and while it is only the 
former that suffers to-day by the absence 
of the American flag on the high seas, a 
European war, with its wide ramifications 
and consequences, would soon awaken us 
to realizing the shortcomings of our present 
policy. Under existing conditions it is not 
difficult to picture American factories and 
workmen reduced to idleness because a 
foreign war had brought about a virtual 
cessation of ocean transport. 

Even more important than the creation 



42 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

of an American merchant marine is that at 
a time of uncertainty Hke the present, with 
the future still befogged, no efforts be spared 
to maintain our relative naval strength. 
Already we have fallen from the second 
place which, for a decade, we had occupied, 
and without greater exertion are likely to 
sink still further in the scale. The recent 
decision of Congress to curtail the program 
of naval construction could not have been 
less auspiciously chosen in its moment. For 
us to desist from a normal development, 
which hardly aims to do more than replace 
timeworn unities when all the nations of 
the world, great and small, are arming, 
is to court a disaster and to lay us open to 
the consequences of such imprudence. The 
apostles of any one-sided disarmament at 
a time like the present are blindly working 
to expose their country to a disgraceful 
war or a yet more disgraceful humiliation. 
In the event of a European conflagration 
our fleet, even if maintained at its present 
relative strength, might find difficulty in 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 43 

accomplishing its double task of preserving 
the status quo in the Far East, and enforcing 
the neutrality of the Caribbean, where the 
presence of hostilities would certainly em- 
barrass and possibly endanger American 
interests. The preservation of the Pax 
Americana as a corollary to the Monroe 
Doctrine should be our goal at all times. 
We have everything to gain by the peaceful 
and orderly evolution of existing conditions 
on our hemisphere and nothing by sudden 
or violent changes, even where our interests 
do not appear to be immediately affected. 
Hence any attempt to make of American 
waters the scene of war would be extremely 
distasteful to our policy. 

The question of neutrality of the Carib- 
bean might even be broached by diplomatic 
channels in time of peace. To Great Britain 
and France it would in all likelihood be 
welcome, as ridding them of solicitude in 
respect to islands difficult of defense, and 
where their sole ambition is to maintain but 
not to extend. Nor could Germany, possess- 



44 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

ing no territorial interests in these seas^ 
avow pretensions which would place her in 
opposition to us. An international agree- 
ment having this purpose in view would 
thus contribute toward guaranteeing a sta-^ 
bility of present possession, keeping the peace 
in the event of a European conflict and 
removing the likelihood of possible future 
changes of title embarrassing to the strategic 
and political position we occupy there. The 
alternative of a German victory, with the 
acquisition of a base of operations or even 
of territorial advantages, close to Central 
America, where Germans already possess 
great interests, and commanding the ap- 
proaches to Panama, could not leave us 
indifferent to the future of such a prospect. 
An Anglo-German conflict would thus 
affect us at various points and in various 
ways. There is hardly a branch of our 
national activity, governmental or economic, 
which would not feel its consequences in 
varying degree or be concerned by its out- 
come. While our attitude in such contest 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 45 

would in the beginning be one of strict 
neutrality, which we would endeavor to 
maintain, this does not mean that a far- 
sighted policy might not under certain con- 
tingencies impose a different course of action. 
However considerable the responsibility in- 
curred, however great the bait offered, it 
would not be wise statemanship to remain 
passive if England should by any series of 
disasters be crushed. Even though the 
immediate consequence would be to throw 
Canada and the British Antilles into our 
lap, it would leave us confronted by an 
Empire supreme on land and sea, and would 
force us to pursue a preparation of arma- 
ments which for our own preservation could 
not be inferior to what we might be called 
upon to face. Without the knowledge of 
the country at large, the European balance 
of power is a political necessity which can 
alone sanction the continuance of an economic 
development unhandicapped by the burden 
of extensive armaments. At no time, even 
unknown to us, were European politics a 



46 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

matter of indifference to our vital interests, 
but if hitherto we were impotent to alter 
their march, a fortunate destiny preserved 
the existing balance independently of us. 

Seeking, as little as in the past, any selfish 
benefit in the Old World, even though it 
were possible, we have to-day a distinct 
and legitimate duty in the family of great 
nations in contributing to preserve those 
elements which compose the balance of 
power, and to which we can only be blind 
at our later cost. The disappearance or 
diminution of any one State in Europe 
would be a calamity to us, varying with its 
degree. But while the importance of such 
extinction might not in certain instances be 
sufficiently close to warrant or provoke our 
active intervention, this would not be true 
with Great Britain. The disintegration of 
the British Empire would be a defeat for us 
by the erection of a Power supreme on land 
and sea. A German historian of reputation. 
Professor Oncken, of Heidelberg, has lately, 
with reason, expounded the view that in 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 47 

1864, in the war over the Duchies, England 
was unconsciously defeated. *'Had Schles- 
wig-Holstein remained Danish, the right bank 
of the Elbe up to the gates of Hamburg not 
been German territory, and the Canal from 
the Baltic to the North Sea an impossibility, 
all the conditions of Germany's maritime 
position would have been nonexistent." 
French historians have similarly traced the 
beginnings of their disasters in 1870 to their 
noninterference in the affair of the Duchies. 
The lesson of how a failure to act later reacts 
should not be lost upon us. 

To consider the possible contingency of 
such intervention by us as tantamount to 
an alliance with Great Britain would be 
untrue. Where there is no treaty there is 
no alHance. We do not keep England from 
war nor push her toward a conflict. In 
the event of hostilities the assertion of our 
neutrality would at once be made and strictly 
hved up to. If Germany and England 
choose to indulge in the luxury of war, 
such is their right. However much we may 



48 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

lament the loss of life, it is no affair of ours 
even though England were defeated, so long 
as the general balance is preserved. But 
if ever decisive results are about to be regis- 
tered of a nature calculated to upset what 
has for centuries been the recognized political 
fabric of Europe, we can remain indifferent 
thereto only at our own eventual cost. If 
we then neglect to observe that the interests 
of the nations crushed are likewise our own, 
we shall be guilty of political blindness which 
we will later rue. To guard against this 
danger our diplomatic role in Europe should 
be far more active than in the past. Prop- 
erly understood and carried out by skillful 
agents, it would be one which, instead of 
being resented, should entitle us to the 
gratitude of all lovers of peace, since it would 
be apparent that without selfish designs of 
our own we aimed to preserve the rights of 
all. 

It is mistaking the nature of diplomacy 
to think that this would involve us in en- 
tanglements wherein we had no concern. 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 49 

But it is likewise mistaking its scope for 
national utility to accord by an attitude of 
indifferent passivity a free field to the forceful 
ambition of any single State. Great Britain, 
by upholding the European balance of power, 
has contributed toward our free development. 
If misfortune in arms await her, it would be 
as politically unwise as it would be un- 
generous to allow her to suffer unduly. A 
disastrous defeat inflicted by an opponent 
unwilling to use moderation in his victory 
should invite on our part a friendly mediation 
which in last extremity might have to be 
converted into more effective measures. 
Hence the advisability for us of preserving 
our strength in such a way as ever to make 
our counsel welcome and our action un- 
necessary. 



THE WAR AND AMERICAN 
POLICY 

At the last Hague Conference, where a 
Congress, convened for the furtherance of 
peace, mainly discussed the aspects of war 
and the method of its declaration, a Chinese 
delegate excited some amusement by his 
inquiry of what would occur if the nation 
to whom such declaration was addressed did 
not wish to receive it. 

If one thing stands out more than another 
in the recent catastrophe, it has been the 
manner in which countries earnestly desiring 
peace, having no interest, direct or indirect, 
in the question at issue, have yet, through 
no fault of their own, been dragged into the 
whirlpool. An Austrian Archduke is mur- 
dered by a Servian anarchist. In the period 
of silence which follows, the crime is half 
forgotten by the world. New events occupy 
it: a grave crisis threatening civil war in 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 51 

Ireland; a sensational trial in France; labor 
troubles in Russia coinciding with the French 
President's visit. Suddenly reparation of the 
most rigorous kind is demanded, and practi- 
cally accepted by Servia in the interests of 
peace, though her official responsibility was 
doubtful. But the answer is termed insin- 
cere by a Government desiring to provoke 
war. The structure of peace tumbles like 
a house of cards, and within a fortnight the 
Belgian countryside is charred and rav- 
aged by invading German armies, its cities 
burned, and the land itself, in the words of 
its foremost churchman, is a pool of blood. 
Certainly, it is easy to apportion blame, 
and to indicate causes. But the superficial 
causes are not always the real, while philo- 
sophic reasons are often invoked where the 
explanation is far simpler. There are those, 
particularly in America, who have seen in the 
great war the dead hand of alliances, and 
regard it as the condemnation of a system 
which automatically extends warfare instead 
of localizing it. But Belgium, whose neu- 



52 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

trality by a final touch of irony had been 
guaranteed by the very Power violating it, 
was free from all such entanglements. With 
alliances it is as with armaments: the 
example forces emulation. In addition to 
the gospel of force which Bismarck left as a 
two-edged legacy to Germany, he brought 
also the alliance with Austria. The Franco- 
Russian alliance was its inevitable reply. 
Yet, without the dictates of self-preservation, 
the formal terms of such treaties would prove 
of slight consequence. Italy, a member of 
the Triple Alhance, had no compunction in 
refusing to participate in what she regarded 
a war of aggression, while England, though 
free from all obligations, felt otherwise. 

Yet England was as pacific as Belgium. 
Lord Beaconsfield once remarked that though 
a British Prime Minister has many interests, 
none are greater than the preservation of 
peace. At the risk of reiterating the obvious, 
a great commercial nation like England, 
with no continental ambitions, amply 
satisfied with existing responsibilities which 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 53 

she does not seek to extend, has nothing to 
gain by war, which, in the event of non- 
success, threatens her national existence. 
During the recent crisis no country did more 
for the preservation of peace. To an im- 
partial mind, the British Blue Book is here 
conclusive. Sir Edward Grey's offer that 
if Germany would put forward any reason- 
able proposal, making it clear that she and 
Austria were striving to preserve the peace 
of Europe against France and Russia, Eng- 
land would not support the latter, remained 
unanswered. In the medley of German 
Imperial and official telegrams, the text of 
which has in certain selected cases been 
published, no reply was ever made to this. 
Nor was France more anxious for war. 
If one nation more than another has com- 
pletely changed its character, and having 
been the firebrand of Europe, was en- 
deavoring to settle down to the peaceful 
enjoyment of its prosperity, it has been 
France. The increasing gravitation of the 
Government toward social reforms, the pro- 



54 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

nounced pacifism of its dominant political 
parties, the sacrifices and even humiliations 
endured by a proud nation, were as many 
pledges toward the sincerity of its desire to 
maintain peace. Even the recent military 
efforts, hardly begun and still incomplete, 
were a tardy rejoinder to the colossal prep- 
arations which Germany had of late years 
been making. No great power was less 
desirous for war than France, none short of 
national suicide would have gone to greater 
lengths to avoid it. 

It can hardly be supposed that Russia 
wanted war. Even if no other reason existed, 
the fact that, after her disastrous experiences, 
she was in the midst of a military and naval 
reorganization which could not be completed 
before several years, was sufficient to make 
peace almost imperative. In the interests 
of peace she had submitted to the Austrian 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 
the interests of peace she had submitted 
to seeing a Servian army deprived of the 
fruits of victory after its memorable march 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 55 

to the Adriatic. In the interests of peace 
she had allowed an artificial Albanian State 
to be created at the expense of her Slav 
kinsmen. She was allowing Austria to exact 
punishment from Servia, and herself coun- 
seled the moderation of the reply from 
Belgrade. But there were limits beyond 
which self-respect would not let her go. 

The pacific dispositions of the German 
people have repeatedly been noticed. There 
is little doubt that the vast majority did 
not want war. With all sides thus pro- 
fessing their wish for peace, and advertising 
their labors for its preservation, what series 
of colossal blunders precipitated the out- 
break.^ How came such an apparently 
undesired catastrophe to occur for which 
no nation will take the responsibihty.^ The 
Germans attribute it to the Emperor's almost 
accidental discovery of Russia's secret mobili- 
zation. But Russia had no interest to make 
war, France and England had no desire, 
and Belgium, the first victim, was a neutral- 
ized State. The only avowedly designed 



56 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

war was against Servia, which in the 
Austrian intention was to be a punitive 
expedition. The great war itself remains 
anonymous. Is its guilt undiscoverable.^ 

The German people did not want war. 
But in a nation where, in spite of its high 
boast of civilization, public opinion is notori- 
ously in its infancy, the pacific inclination 
of the people exercised no influence on the 
German Emperor and his military advisers, 
who regarded the moment as singularly 
opportune for a conflict. The famous Ger- 
man theory of a preventive war intended to 
forestall an ulterior danger found here its 
exemplification. The people were told they 
were being attacked; partial truths, de- 
natured from their real significance, were 
announced to them. And the people believed 
the ofiicial equivocations, with the same 
spirit of submissive obedience with which 
they took up arms. If the suppleness of 
the Bismarck tradition had been cast aside, 
at least its gross misrepresentation of facts 
had been preserved. 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 57 

A transcendental reason has been advanced 
by the German side, where the struggle is 
declared as one between Teutonism and 
Slavism, supported by its Western allies. 
The cause of war lay in the supposed designs 
to Servia to make herself a great Power 
at the expense of Austro-Hungary. Ground 
may have existed for such suspicion. The 
recent successes of Servia had strengthened 
the magnet of attraction for the millions of 
Slavs within the Austrian Empire, ill-satisfied 
by their treatment at the hands of a bureau- 
cratic administration wanting in sympathy 
and suppleness. The tension between the 
two countries had further imposed on Austria 
repeated and expensive mobilizations on her 
frontiers, and a state of watchfulness con- 
ducive to irritability and harshness. From 
the Austrian point of view the situation 
was one which could not be prolonged, and 
the time seemed ripe. Servia was tem- 
porarily exhausted by the three wars she 
had been obliged to wage almost within a 
year, and which, if they left her victorious, 



58 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

had none the less crippled her. Russia, 
imperfectly prepared, could in turn, it was 
thought, expect little aid from her Western 
ally. Is it to be supposed that Austria 
wanted to fight Russia.^ Certainly, if she 
could have achieved her aim to crush Servian 
independence without such war, she would 
have preferred it. But she took the risk 
with full knowledge that war might, and 
probably would, ensue. "The remotest pos- 
sible consequences of this action have been 
carefully considered," appeared in a Viennese 
official organ. The war with Servia was 
provoked in all deliberation. The war with 
Russia was accepted with full prior knowl- 
edge of its likelihood. 

To what extent was Germany responsible 
for this.f^ Before taking the final step it is 
known that Austria had consulted her and 
received full assent. Whether the German 
Foreign Office had previously read the text 
of the Austrian note to Servia is immaterial. 
With diplomatic casuistry it had probably 
been submitted privately, but not officially, 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 59 

to the German Emperor's approval. A com- 
plete indorsement was, in any case, given for 
a reason frankly explained by the German 
White Book. The fear expressed at Berlin 
lay not only in an eventual Servian success, 
but also lest the numerically preponderant 
Slav element within the Austrian Empire 
should increase at the expense of the German, 
and thus alter its political complexion. It 
seemed vital to check this movement at any 
cost, and preserve the Germanic influence. 
The war was thus made to assume the ap- 
pearance of a great racial conflict which was 
to mark the definite victory, or defeat, of 
Teutonism. The criminal plot of two 
Emperors, seizing a supposedly favorable 
moment to set Europe ablaze, was dignified 
into a struggle of race protection, and ac- 
claimed by two nations conscious that all 
military preparations had been completed 
while its adversaries were still unready, and 
believing implicitly in the victory of its 
armies. 

Respect for treaties as "scraps of paper," 



60 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

or the rights of neutrals, or indeed respect 
for its own word, all disappeared in the 
German mind before the law of alleged 
necessity. The Fatherland attacked by the 
Slavs, the national danger and the final 
triumph, were visions alternately flashed by 
a disciplined press. Ably, if unscrupulously 
exploited, this has filled the German armies 
with a profound conviction in the justice 
of their cause. The wave of military bar- 
barism sweeping over a country once 
civilized, is interpreted in Germany as a 
lofty ideal of civilization and humanity. 
Having identified themselves with whatever 
is noblest, they regard the German cause as 
inseparably connected therewith, and dis- 
parage their Western foes as a soulless, 
heterogeneous lot, prompted by jealous mo- 
tives to assist the Slav barbarian. 

It is well to realize the German point of 
view, since it explains much that is otherwise 
incomprehensible, and serves as a future 
lesson for others than the belligerents. 
France is thus a nation in decay, whose 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 61 

historical mission being over, occupies a 
place to which she is no longer entitled. 
Germany is destined to take her place. But 
the chief indignation has been against Eng- 
land, who, out of motives of jealousy, has 
betrayed the interests of the Teutonic race 
by her unholy alliance with Russia and 
Japan. 

The neutral observer is less impressed by 
the insolence of the Pan-German ideal which 
of late years has been fostered by hysterical 
professors and retired officers, than by its 
hold upon a nation priding itself on morality, 
yet throwing to the winds the most elemental 
considerations of national honesty in the 
effort to win. This absence of all political 
scruple, coupled with a perfection of organ- 
ization, a spirit of obedience and the 
possession of whatever resources science can 
procure, and accompanied by a readiness 
of sacrifice admirable in another cause, has 
made the German nation the most powerful 
organization for enforcing executive policy 
the world has yet seen. It also makes the 



62 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

consequences of German victory certain to 
extend far beyond the nations defeated. 

In Italy this danger has already been 
understood, especially by the Socialists, who, 
in spite of the efforts made by their political 
brethren in Germany and Austria to win 
them over, after stigmatizing the war as one 
of aggression by these two countries, have 
realized that their success would imply a 
triumph of militarism, menacing Italian de- 
mocracy. The fear of such victory, tending 
at its best to reduce Italy to the position 
of a vassal state, is widely spread, and in the 
light of German ambitions can be regarded 
as neither unjustified nor exaggerated. While 
proclaiming neutrality, the Italian Socialists 
have had no hesitation in expressing their 
sympathy for the Allies, in which they 
reflect the opinion of the country at large. 

The consequences of German victory will 
not, however, be confined to the Continent 
of Europe. It would be casting on Pan- 
German ambition a willful slur to assess its 
aspirations so low. In the event of their 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 63 

success we, too, will be privileged to 
encounter these. 

In the United States we have gazed upon 
the distant spectacle of war with the keen 
interest which the greatest event of modern 
times has warranted. Even as spectators, 
we have been thrilled by the deeds of 
heroism, while its train of misery and 
suffering has awakened our sympathy. We 
have relieved the plight of our stranded 
travelers and have watched conscientiously 
over the obligations of neutrality. We have 
scanned the situation from its commercial 
possibilities, and reawakened to the need 
of a merchant marine. We have studied 
the crisis from every point save one, though 
it is the one which most closely touches 
our interests. In what way will this war 
affect our future.^ Surely no graver question 
has ever loomed on the horizon of American 
policy. 

For ourselves we have hitherto felt little 
anxiety. There has almost been a smug 
satisfaction at the three thousand miles of 



64 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

ocean separating America from the main 
seat of war, coupled with the feehng that we 
are privileged in being able to lead our 
life independently of the bloody childishness 
which has arrested the development of our 
commercial rivals. While such ideas may 
not reflect the finer instincts in the country, 
the consequences of the great struggle have 
otherwise hardly impressed themselves. The 
"plague on both your houses" has been a 
more frequent point of view than the real- 
ization of future possibilities in so far as the 
success of one or the other side may affect 
our position. 

The entire military fabric of continental 
Europe has been one so alien to our habits 
of thought, and until lately to our general 
knowledge, that the conception of the nation 
in arms, which has for its basis the execution 
of policy, yet seemed by an odd paradox 
devoid of all practical wisdom. To the 
average American it was always a riddle 
why countries whose high technical skill 
in other directions we had frequent occasion 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 65 

to appreciate, should yet pay such attention 
to armaments. There seemed something al- 
most childish connected with this idea which 
Civil War traditions confirmed rather than 
dispelled. We remembered with pride our 
citizen armies raised when danger threatened, 
and the patriotic determination which, on 
either side, saw them through to victory or 
defeat. We had regarded them not without 
reason as equal to the best professional 
soldiers. We remembered our great leaders 
who had risen in the hour of need. But we 
were inclined to forget that two years elapsed 
before the Northern armies could be welded 
into efficient combatant bodies, and that the 
long-protracted situation was only rendered 
possible by the disabilities which weighed 
equally on either side. 

Between the Civil and the Spanish War, 
our military efficiency sank to its lowest ebb. 
Even afterward, in spite of new problems 
and responsibilities, in spite of the precarious- 
ness of our hold in the Philippines and the 
burdens assumed in Latin-America, we have 



66 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

done little to improve it. Apart from the 
fleet which, in the face of German naval 
increase, could not long keep the second 
position it had temporarily attained, the 
army, through no fault of its own, remained 
inferior in numbers and organization to that 
of the smallest European State. The armed 
forces of Bulgaria and Switzerland, nations 
less in population than New York City, 
far exceed our own and indeed surpass any 
army which we could put into the field 
before probably six months of preparation. 
Such military inferiority has hitherto not 
proved a handicap nor acted otherwise than 
to our advantage. The economic prosperity 
of the nation has been largely built up by a 
condition of peace which has freed us from 
the saddling burden of armaments. In con- 
tinental Europe, in spite of every euphemistic 
explanation, the years passed with the colors 
are taxes on their youth. From such neces- 
sity we have fortunately been dispensed. 
But we are prone, as a result, to lay undue 
stress on our insular position in respect to 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 67 

Europe, without realizing the factors of dif- 
ferent order which alone have made it 
possible. It has been far less the distance 
which allowed our previous weakness than 
it has been the division of Europe into two 
camps. Unrealized by the nation at large, 
the famous balance of power which for 
centuries has been the basis of European^ 
diplomacy, allowed us a freedom from mili- 
tary burdens which we were inclined to 
ascribe exclusively to our pacifism, our 
superior wisdom, and our favorable geo- 
graphical position. 

Although lately the Old World has regarded 
our policy toward Mexico as insolent, it yet 
confined itself to mere criticism as a result 
of the intense strain of a situation which 
allowed no European State to divert any 
portion of its strength in a secondary enter- 
prise. We have been pleased to consider 
the consequence as a tribute to our high 
moral service rather than to the circum- 
stances permitting us to do what we liked, 
where we liked, and how we liked, with our 



68 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

southern neighbors. So long as a European 
balance of power continues as before, such 
liberty will continue to be ours to use or to 
abuse. But if, as the result of this war, 
the predominance of one Power is asserted, 
our own future sphere of action, nay, our 
own future security, will require for its 
preservation steps of entirely different order. 

War is so inseparable from the realities 
of forces, that since the issues of the struggle 
must depend on the success of arms, it may 
seem waste of time to discuss, at this stage, 
the premises of peace. Though convictions 
now take the place of knowledge, yet certain 
factors seem assured. By whatever paths the 
highroad of peace be approached, the latter 
can come only through the United States. 

This is far from meaning that the well- 
intentioned efforts at mediation suggested 
in the atmosphere of Washington will prove 
efficacious before the moment is ripe. The 
questions at issue are so gigantic, the destiny 
of nations so deeply implicated, as hardly 
to encourage the success of any venture 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 69 

before the complete exhaustion of either, 
or of both sides — the fate awaiting the 
conquered is too oppressive to dispense the 
nations at war from anything short of their 
highest effort. The lately published treaty 
between France, Great Britain, and Russia, 
moreover, precludes any individual negoti- 
ation for peace. Between Austria and Ger- 
many the terms of alliance stipulate a similar 
arrangement, hence all hope is vain that 
any one nation's exhaustion might induce 
it to sue separately for peace. If present 
prospects point to the war being fought out 
to the bitterest end, this in no way lessons 
the peace-bearer's efforts. The colossal strain 
on the moral and material resources of every 
nation, the waste of blood and treasure, 
the increasing hardships and misery, which 
must be felt by those who stay at home, 
will all exert their silent pressure. That 
the wish for peace will be heard by us is 
certain. It is less sure that we will know 
how best to utilize our efforts in our own 
interests and in those of civilization. 



70 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

If it is intended to restrict American good 
oflSces to the simple transmission of demands 
and the haggHng over terms, the task of 
mediation will manifestly not be arduous. 
For the offering of a neutral ground on which 
to conduct the negotiations, United States 
territory or sponsorship would be unnecessary 
— the Principality of Monaco might as well 
answer such purpose. It will be urged that 
the moral weight of lesser countries is inferior 
to our own. Confidence in public morality 
remains a pretty fancy in the light of recent 
events. With the ruins of Lou vain still 
smoldering, is it to be supposed that a 
victorious Germany would be more likely 
to feel such restraint in the moment of 
triumph than when the outcome was still 
uncertain .f^ Our hopes may find themselves 
shattered, if they rely too exclusively 
on moral weight. In the end it will triumph, 
it must triumph, but under present conditions 
only when it emanates from a reserve of force 
able to make itself felt. 

Although nothing has wisely been said. 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 71 

it is probable that the administration looks 
forward to a less modest part than the one 
of mere transmission of negotiations between 
the two sides. The task of peacemaker 
comports so many possibilities, and the prem- 
ises of peace will be of such importance 
in shaping the future history of the world, 
that as the interests affected in the settle- 
ment v/ill extend far beyond those of the 
nations at war, the action of peacemaker 
suggests rather an extension of the part we 
may hope to play than any willful restriction. 
Nor will it be possible to make the most of 
our opportunities if we delay decision on the 
extent given to mediation until negotiations 
begin. While its nature and character may 
be left to the shaping of events, the time 
to prepare for it has already begun, and 
any further delay or remissness in that 
respect is likely to be attended with serious 
consequences. 

The fear may therefore be entertained that 
the desire to give present expression to an 
exaggerated pacifism and the reluctance to 



72 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

avoid any semblance of departure from com- 
plete neutrality may deprive us from taking 
necessary measures of precaution lest they 
receive an erroneous construction. In reality 
a distinction should be made between the 
attitude of the Government and the sym- 
pathies of the nation in respect to the great 
war. The first has properly been one of 
entire neutrality. Our interests remain un- 
touched, and nothing has yet occurred of 
a nature to affect these. If we now watch 
over them with vigilance, no cause for appre- 
hension should exist. 

American sympathies, on the other hand, 
if the feehngs of the vast majority of the 
nation are correctly interpreted, have been 
wholeheartedly with the Alhes. Our moral 
sense has revolted before the ruthlessness 
of the Prussian doctrine of war, and German 
attempts to shift the burden of aggression 
have only encountered a skeptical derision. 
Certainly, the defeat of Germany promises 
a moral recasting of the world. The great 
Liberal wave which had swept over Europe 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 73 

seventy years ago receded when Bismarck 
introduced the era of force. The battles 
between Germans and AlHes are far less 
battles between different nations than they 
represent the contrast between Liberalism 
and reaction, between the aspirations of 
democracy and the gospel of iron. In the 
presence of the great forces locked in battle 
our feelings cannot remain indifferent. 
American sympathy would be untrue to its 
most generous traditions if it expressed any 
other hope than in the success of the allied 
cause. The difficulty for our statecraft is 
to reconcile such feelings with the duties of 
neutrality and the wish to be of service in 
ending the war. But this difficulty is per- 
haps more apparent than real. In no way 
does it clash with our obligations or the 
guiding lines of what our policy should be. 

At the moment when the maximum of 
military efficiency has been attained by every 
other power, it is presuming too much on 
fortune to rely on the sole persuasiveness of 
moral force. In doing so we restrict the 



74 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

scope of our utility and expect an imponder- 
able element, which is almost the test of 
civilization, to achieve results of importance 
in a moment of barbarism and under the 
handicap of unfair conditions. Thus far we 
are only curtailing the possibilities of our own 
beneficent action in respect to other nations. 
But in a struggle with problems involving 
such world-embracing aspects, it is by no 
means inconceivable that without the exer- 
cise of vigilance our nearer interests may 
be seriously affected. The recasting of con- 
tinental Europe may be a matter of political 
indifference to us, but it might not be so 
with the transfer of authority in other parts 
of the globe. Though we may welcome a 
New Zealand occupation of Samoa, the 
Japanese siege of Tsingtau is not without 
exciting apprehension in the light of Man- 
churian experiences and open-door pledges, 
while a German move against Martinique 
could not be viewed with apathy. But 
without speculating on different possibilities 
which can here be evoked, it is apparent that 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 75 

the political aspects of peace may concern 
us far more closely than we now anticipate. 
Nor is it unreasonable to consider a possible 
exchange of continental territory for colonial 
possessions. In the event of a draw, for 
instance, the cession to France of Lorraine 
in return for certain of the French tropical 
colonies, among which might be Guyana, 
would be, if remote, a not impossible con- 
tingency. Such transfers might not be in 
every event indifferent to us, and we can 
be hardly satisfied that our unsupported 
moral objections during or before the peace 
negotiations would provide an adequate 
restraint in every case. We are now travers- 
ing a crisis in the history of the world when 
we may pay dear for undue optimism or 
weakness. The devil is in arms, and the old 
saw that the devil must be fought with his 
own weapons never rang truer. While we 
have before us the grave duty of making 
heard our voices in the interests of peace, we 
have also that of safeguarding our interests. 
It is well to keep our moral persuasion in 



76 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

evidence. It will prove more efficacious if 
behind it our power is apparent. 

At first glance, and independently of our 
sympathies, the triumph of either side might 
seem to lead to a result which, according 
to the construction given, would be either 
indifferent or affect us equally. But a closer 
analysis indicates the vast difference between 
the victory of the Allied Powers and that 
of Germany and Austria. The reason is 
unconsciously explained by the Germans 
themselves, who reproached their enemies 
with forming a heterogeneous collection of 
nations, bound together without common 
ideal and whose sole link of union is pro- 
vided by a mutual antagonism. The fair- 
ness is questionable of disparaging their 
enemies' motives, but it would be difficult 
to find three nations wider apart than France, 
Great Britain, and Russia. Yet the two 
Western States present points of contact. 
Both are liberal nations in the sense that they 
are governed by the people, and that both 
at the outbreak of the war were engaged in 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 77 



working out great programs of democratic 
reform. Both were satisfied with their situ- 
ation as capitahst nations and had lost the 
appetite for conquest. In both, too, a large 
and influential party actively planning to 
bring about disarmament had only been 
restrained by the fear of its one-sided nature. 
Both, too, were Powers with American pos- 
sessions whose status in the event of the 
defeat of their home countries would raise up 
new problems. Although it is hkely that 
Germany would wilhngly have given us assur- 
ances in this respect or even in accordance 
with her record of generosity for territories 
other than her own, have offered us as many 
of the West Indies as we signified our wish 
to obtain, the advantage of such acquisitions 
might, under the circumstances, be doubtful. 
With regard to Russia the situation was 
somewhat different, though the Russia of 
to-morrow is little likely to be that of yester- 
day. The country is now traversed by vast 
democratic currents whose influence must 
be felt more and more. The Russian specter 



78 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

of reaction had long tempted terrified Liberal 
Europe, and the nightmare was successfully 
utilized by Germany to bring her Socialists 
into line. In the Prussian War of Liberation 
a century ago, she had been glad enough to 
obtain the aid of the Cossacks, and the 
Russian alliance was long the goal of Bis- 
marckian diplomacy, but she now denounced 
her Eastern neighbor as barbarous. It was 
even hoped at Berlin and Vienna that the 
fact of the war being primarily against 
Russia might keep France from living up to 
terms of an alliance never popular with the 
working classes, and maintain England 
neutral. But the Russian bogy of the past 
appeared less threatening than the German 
peril of the present. 

The criticism leveled at the Allies had at 
least this foundation, that their victory 
meant the triumph of a combination without 
other than temporary unity brought about 
by the common wish to resist German 
aggression and predominance. Its success 
would therefore not materially affect our 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 79 

position. While there might be changes in 
the map of Europe, the rights of neutrals 
would be vindicated, the balance of power 
restored, and a relative, if not a general 
disarmament, most welcome to us would 
probably ensue. There is certainly nothing 
in the record of either Great Britain or 
France in recent years to lead any reasonable 
person to suppose that their efforts would 
in case of victory be directed against us, 
or would not insure a lasting peace. 

Can the same be said of Germany.? With- 
out going so far as to admit the successful 
invasion of Great Britain, except after 
another war, it is not impossible to conceive 
the reahty of the Pan-German dream, — to 
picture Holland, Belgium, and Northeastern 
France as German provinces; to see the rest 
of France, Italy, and Spain reduced to the 
proportions of vassal states, with Russia 
crushed, her Baltic provinces annexed to 
Prussia, and Poland forming part of an 
Austria even more completely dominated 
by Berlin; the Levant would be controlled 



80 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

through her Turkish satelhte, while the pos- 
session of the French and Dutch colonies 
would make German influence paramount 
in the Far East, and in rivalry with our own 
through Latin- America. All this may appear 
to us indifferent: certainly Germany in 
victory, perhaps more than in defeat, will 
aim to flatter our opinion and enlist those 
sympathies which always go to the con- 
queror. The same German Press Bureau 
will extend its propaganda, and the same 
official instructions which caused American 
flags to be spontaneously waved before our 
departing tourists will redouble their ordered 
amiabilities. Though success exceed all Ger- 
man expectations, we still will find ourselves 
courted, our sagacity praised, our money 
borrowed until — until the ruins of the war 
will have made way for new edifices, the 
gaps in the army filled, the navy rebuilt, 
the fortresses and arsenals extended, the 
treasure replenished, and the same patient 
labor which lifted the Germany of 1870 to 
the Germany of 1914 has been repeated. 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 81 

Is this the future to which we must look 
forward, and is the doctrine of force to be 
the inevitable accompaniment of progress? 
Yes and no. The success of modern Ger- 
many has been due to its wonderful spirit 
of disciplined effort in conjunction with high 
technical efficiency. It has not sought to 
conquer hearts nor to awaken sympathies. 
There are millions of Germans, other than 
Poles and Alsatians and Danes, ill satisfied 
with their government. The rifts of classes 
lie deep, with little mutual sympathy to 
bridge them over. The vigorous remains 
of Prussian feudalism, all powerful in the 
army and the administration, have not un- 
frequently clashed with the democratic as- 
pirations of a new industrial Germany. In 
the stress of war the sense of discipline, 
the feeling of danger, and the menda- 
cious presentation of the case have for 
the time fused the entire population. All 
parties are now on their mettle, the military 
aristocracy to maintain its supremacy by 
qualities of leadership, and the new democracy 



82 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

to prove its patriotism. But for those who 
look beyond and see peace after the great 
war, the entire shaping of the German future 
must depend on the issue. Should she be 
defeated, it is inconceivable that the anoma- 
lous condition under which she has retained 
a *' Samurai" class will not terminate. No 
unsuccessful adventure could authorize the 
preservation of a military caste unable to 
accomplish the purpose of its existence. The 
new industrial Germany, representing the 
same Liberal elements as came to the fore in 
1848, the German democracy, sincerely peace- 
loving, would then assert its own, and refuse 
to accept any longer the inferiority to which 
they have been relegated by a reactionary 
Prussian Junkerdom, Without wishing the 
destruction of the German Empire, it is 
possible to conceive of a new German regime, 
republican or monarchical, where an en- 
lightened public opinion breathed nobler 
aspirations than the crude imperialism and 
worship of force of the present Hohenzollerns. 
A victorious Germany would, on the other 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 83 

band, provide a definite consecration for the 
existing pyramid with its dominating miHtary 
apex. It would inevitably encourage Ger- 
man faith in their actual institutions and 
incite the spirit of intolerant aggression which 
now spurs them on to world domination: 
alone of all national anthems the Deutschland 
iiber Alles proclaims German superiority 
over all the world. The instruments of Pan- 
German propaganda through its different 
leagues would once more furrow opinion 
and instill in it new seeds of hatred against 
whoever dared thwart the Chosen of the 
Lord. Irritability would again be manifested 
at any remaining relics of independence 
elsewhere, and reliance on the army of five 
million bayonets would once more be invoked 
on every occasion. Forecasts are hazardous, 
but from Germany's past record, again con- 
firmed by success, it is obvious that the same 
all-prevailing spirit of militarism will main- 
tain its ascendancy. The only difference 
will be, that as former elements of restraint 
shall have been destroyed or cowed by 



84 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

German victories, an even more emphatic 
assertion of aggressive policy is to be 
expected. 

With such a prospect would it be possible 
for a nation as alert and as intelligent as 
our own to continue unarmed in the future 
as in the past, relying solely on the peaceful- 
ness of our intentions? Grave fear exists 
lest, with the profound pacifism of the 
country, with our confidence in the vast 
extent of our resources, and in the patriotism 
of our people, we may be disposed to neglect 
our defenses, taking at their word German 
professions of friendship. Imbued with the 
virtue of our policies, we persuade ourselves 
that what is self-evident to us is also so to 
others. General von Bernhardi, in his book 
on Germany and the next War, alludes iron- 
ically to our childlike self-consciousness, with 
which we appear to believe that public 
opinion must represent the view which 
American plutocrats think most profitable 
to themselves. We do not realize that 
Germans feel equally convinced of their 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 85 

righteousness. But between their poHcy and 
our own the difference is that theirs never 
exceeds the Hmitations of an executive able 
to enforce the same; while with us a fre- 
quently incompetent diplomacy, recruited 
and directed rather with a view to political 
benefits than to larger national objectives, 
runs the risk of clashing with a powerful 
and ambitious nation able at all times to 
rely on the support of its armed strength. 

If we do not neglect our duty, we must 
realize that the German triumph cannot 
but impose on us a military strain which in 
the interests of self-preservation will have to 
be as intense as possible. In one form or 
another the universal service idea will be 
introduced. If we are convinced of the 
danger of this impending curse of militarism, 
our existing neutrality, however sincere, can- 
not be disinterested with respect to a struggle 
whose effects on us would vary so greatly. 
It is well to appreciate this at a point where 
the issue still remains doubtful. As in the 
conduct of military operations, a prudent 



86 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

commander maintains his strategic reserve, so 
we may wisely employ our resources and our 
influence as a diplomatic reserve, and though 
preserving neutrality escape the ordeal of 
war, and at the same time reduce the likeli- 
hood of future unwelcome obligations and 
danger. We are able to do so in a manner 
easier than is commonly realized. If we wish 
at least to avoid partially the burdens of 
militarism, it is evident that we must always 
keep another Power between Germany and 
ourselves. For obvious reasons ^ that Power 
can only be England. In a rough way the 
calculation of what this would mean to us 
is simple to make, and may even be mathe- 
matically expressed. Just as England has 
wisely treated France as her "glacis," and by 
present assistance is defending her own 
future, so is Great Britain our bulwark 
against any foreign foe. For the purposes 
of security our strength in respect to Ger- 
many would have to be equal to the difference 

* See the writer's American Foreign Policy, by a Diplomatist. 
Houghton Miflain, Boston, 1909. 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 87 

between English and German strength. The 
more Great Britain is crushed, the more 
her resources are reduced and her strategic 
position weakened, the greater will be the 
effort we shall be called upon to make. 

To guard against this danger, a new 
conception of our diplomatic policy, or rather 
an extension of an ancient policy, becomes 
necessary. We must extend the Monroe 
Doctrine to England and embrace within 
its scope the foremost American Power after 
our own. It must, above all, be made plain 
that this is done not on grounds of common 
civilization or race, or tongue, but on grounds 
of solid interest reinforced by the weight of 
tradition and sentiment, but not guided 
thereby. In the presence of a new European 
danger the integrity of Great Britain has 
become for us a matter of vital concern. 
Such conception may astonish by its novelty. 
It will doubtless be denounced or held in 
derision by those wiseacres whose vision of 
the imperial eagle remains blurred by stag- 
nant memories. The weight of our own 



88 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

traditions would seem to conspire against 
it. But neither our traditions nor oUr past 
experience have ever contemplated such a 
possibility as is now before the world. In 
the presence of new conditions, new ideas 
become necessary, and we would do well to 
borrow a leaf from that German realism 
which gauges a situation in the cold light of 
fact without being deviated by other con- 
siderations. We should then be able to 
understand the situation which a German 
triumph would threaten — of a nation exalted 
by successful war, imbued with the doctrine 
of force, persuaded of the destiny impelling 
it onward to world domination. 

If hitherto we have had occasion to com- 
plain of a Germany athwart our path in the 
Philippines, insidiously threatening us in 
Latin-America, how much more will we have 
cause to complain when the same restraints 
as before no more exist; we will see her chal- 
lenging our policies and chafe at her activity 
crossing our own, while she will declare the 
same of us and instill in her people the con- 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 89 

viction that we are the enemy. The same 
campaign of specious education which the 
doctrine of a Treitschke, a Bernhardi, or a 
Lamprecht have planted in the German 
mind, persuading it of its superiority resting 
on force, will at the seasonable time be in- 
voked against us. Outwardly an Emperor 
will proclaim his love of peace and his regard 
for the United States. But below, those 
who listen will hear the rumblings of a revived 
German agitation against the Monroe 
Doctrine, which Bismarck once described as 
an impertinence. Almost unsuspected by us 
a campaign will be going on, to contrast the 
lofty purpose of German idealism with the 
grossness of our materialism. Public opinion 
will once more be ably exploited to prove 
the superiority of German culture and the 
moral duty imposed upon a noble race to 
put an end to the dollar barbarism of 
America and impress upon us the superior 
stamp of Teutonic civilization. 

If the purpose of our neutrality will have 
been to give Germany time to recover for her 



90 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

next war, if as its result England shall have 
been reduced to a third-rate State, the price 
to pay for such obedience to past traditions 
may come too high. Though our states- 
manship be praised for its prudence, though 
the peaceful intentions of the German people 
be dinned into our ears, some day when, 
perhaps, the fate of Louvain has overtaken 
Boston, when New York will be held up to the 
ransom of a thousand million dollars, when 
improved Zeppelins will have carried, far and 
wide, proofs of the superiority of Teutonic 
civilization, there may be those who will 
regret the sagacity of our traditionalism. 

Yet, if correctly understood, our present 
duty is neither arduous nor hazardous. We 
are averse to war, we seek no selfish benefits. 
We believe that by force of circumstances, 
when the moment for peace arrives, we, and 
we alone, will be able to assist the diflScult 
progress of negotiations. This is the obvious 
aspect of our duty which has impressed itself 
on every one. Beyond it there exists, how- 
ever, a perspective of national insurance in 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 91 

no way irreconcilable with it, though bidding 
us take precautions. It urges us, in order to 
make heard our voice and speak with the 
authority incumbent on our position as a 
great Power, to concentrate our resources 
and instruments of action. These are of 
two kinds, financial and military — neither 
can be neglected. 

We have been somewhat inclined to dis- 
parage the association between finance and 
diplomacy. The nation at large was never 
properly enlightened with regard to its utihty 
in China and in Central America, and not 
unnaturally criticized severely the employ- 
ment of methods which, if sound in their 
basis and goal, were yet not always happily 
inspired and liable to misconstruction. Yet 
it is beyond dispute that in our banking 
resources, especially at a moment like the 
present, we possess a reserve of strength 
and a diplomatic leverage of great magni- 
tude. The question is if this is to be dissi- 
pated in isolated ventures according to the 
aflSliations or sympathies of those who control 



92 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

it, and who in the absence of restraining 
influences might consider themselves justified 
in following such paths as best suit their 
inclinations, or to be treated from a national 
point of view. The banking interests are 
as patriotic as any other, and were the 
feeling of their collective responsibility im- 
pressed upon them, there is every reason 
to anticipate that they would justify such 
confidence. The recent declarations of Mr. 
Lloyd George, that while the first hundred 
millions will be as easily raised in every 
country, the pinch will come over the last 
ten, may find supplementary application in 
our ability to advance funds. If we now 
hold ourselves in reserve it is likely that 
when the time comes, our bankers' action, 
if properly directed, will prove of enormous 
importance as an incentive to peace and 
a protection to our policies. 

Beyond this it behooves us to dismiss once 
for all such ideas as have caused the fleet 
to be disseminated in quest of tourists, 
whose welfare could be looked after by other 



A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 93 

vessels, or suggest its employment for com- 
mercial uses. At a time like this there 
is only one use for it, namely, insurance 
against war. It should unquestionably be 
concentrated and placed on war footing. 
To diminish in any way almost the only 
real asset of active strength we possess is 
little short of criminal. The President, too, 
should call for a quarter of a million volun- 
teers for purposes of instruction. Our 
existing military inferiority demands this 
step which menaces no one. It offers no 
incentive to war, but would be only the 
natural precaution which every other nation, 
great or small, whose interests can be 
affected, has taken. It could in no way 
interfere with our neutrality, but would 
enable our diplomacy to speak, when the 
moment came, with an authority which it 
now lacks. If the meaning of our inten- 
tions were manifest, in the event of the 
victory of a nation which only listens to 
force, our advice, if tendered at the right 
time, might exercise a beneficial effect. A 



94 A PROPHECY OF THE WAR 

quarter of a million raw volunteers seem 
little in comparison with the five millions of 
trained soldiers Germany has called to arms, 
but as an earnest of the future they would 
not be without significance and might save 
us untold sacrifices in years to come. 

With German success upon the Continent 
of Europe we could not expect to interfere. 
Keen as would be our regret at the crushing 
of France, or the destruction of Belgian 
independence, we are unable to prevent 
either misfortune. With regard to England 
it is otherwise. A warning served on Ger- 
many, exhausted even though successful in 
war, should be adequate to restrain her from 
further attack upon a nation whose integral 
preservation after the destruction of other 
forces would alone separate us from a world- 
conquering power. The friendly visit of our 
fleet to British waters might provide another 
hint. Beyond that it should not now be 
necessary to go. The Monroe Doctrine would 
have been extended to Great Britain. 



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